אוסף אמין שנבנה מתוך ניסיון כיתתי עשיר על ידי שני מורים פעילים בהוראת אנגלית.

זה עובד. זה בדוק. פשוט, קל ובחינם.

SEL Series
Teacher’s Lesson Plan
Confidential 📄 Student Handouts →
Lesson Overview
Topic
Why Kindness is Rational — evolutionary biology and game theory show that cooperation and altruism are optimal long-term strategies. The prisoner’s dilemma, tit-for-tat, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and evolutionarily stable strategies.
Central question
“If self-interest is rational, how do we explain the persistence of altruism in both human societies and non-human species?”
Level
B2–C1
Duration
90 minutes
Grammar ★
Inverted conditionals: Were… (hypothetical present/future)  ·  Should… (formal future condition)  ·  Had… (past hypothetical). Inversion replaces if for formal, academic register.
Grammar note
Inverted conditionals omit if and move the auxiliary before the subject. They are a hallmark of C1 formal writing and directly suit the counterfactual reasoning of game theory: Were defection the dominant strategy, cooperation could not have persisted.
Characters
Reading: Academic magazine article — ‘The Rationality of Kindness.’  |  Listening: Dr. James Holt (evolutionary biologist, 44) & Dr. Sarah Chen (game theorist, 39) — podcast.
Vocabulary
10 terms (B2–C1): altruism · reciprocity · evolutionarily stable strategy · prisoner’s dilemma · kin selection · defection · tit-for-tat · reputation · iterated game · fitness cost
Writing
250–300 words · Three options: Personal-Analytical / Argumentative / Opinion-Evaluation
Background for the Teacher
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and iterated games

In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, the dominant strategy is defection: whatever the opponent does, you do better by defecting. But this produces mutual defection and a worse outcome for both players than mutual cooperation — a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-inferior. In iterated games, the dynamic reverses. Future interactions make cooperation rational because defection invites retaliation and destroys the cooperative surplus.

Axelrod’s tournaments and tit-for-tat

Robert Axelrod’s computer tournaments (1980s) invited strategists to submit programmes for iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. The winning strategy — tit-for-tat (Anatol Rapoport) — succeeded through four properties: niceness (starts cooperative), retaliation (punishes defection immediately), forgiveness (returns to cooperation as soon as opponent does), and clarity (simple and predictable). Were tit-for-tat complex or opaque, it would lose its strategic advantage.

Kin selection and reciprocal altruism

W.D. Hamilton (1964) showed that genes promoting altruism toward relatives can spread if the benefit to the recipient, weighted by relatedness, exceeds the fitness cost to the actor (Hamilton’s rule: rB > C). Robert Trivers (1971) extended this to non-kin: reciprocal altruism evolves when the probability of future interaction is sufficiently high. Had evolution favoured only self-interest, neither human cooperation nor animal societies of the complexity we observe would have emerged.

Direct and indirect reciprocity

Direct reciprocity operates between the same two agents (“I help you because you helped me”). Indirect reciprocity operates through reputation: “I help you because others observe and will help me in return.” Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund showed that indirect reciprocity can sustain large-scale cooperation in societies where most interactions are non-repeated, provided reputational information flows efficiently.

Key Grammar — Teaching Notes
★  Inverted Conditionals
Were… — hypothetical present or future (replaces If… were/was…)
Normal: “If self-interest were the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.”
Inverted: “Were self-interest the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.”

“Were tit-for-tat not forgiving, it would lose its cooperative advantage rapidly.”
“Were defection the evolutionarily stable strategy, cooperative societies could not persist.”
“Were reputation to disappear, indirect reciprocity would collapse.”

Topic connection: the whole game-theory argument rests on counterfactuals — what would happen if the conditions changed.
Should… — formal future or present condition (replaces If… should…)
Normal: “If a player should encounter the same opponent again, cooperation becomes rational.”
Inverted: “Should a player encounter the same opponent again, cooperation becomes rational.”

“Should defectors become too numerous in the population, cooperative networks begin to exclude them.”
“Should you find yourself in a repeated interaction, kindness is not naïve — it is optimal.”

Register note: Should… inversion is characteristic of formal academic and legal writing.
Had… — past hypothetical (replaces If… had…)
Normal: “If Axelrod had run only one round, tit-for-tat would not have won.”
Inverted: “Had Axelrod run only one round, tit-for-tat would not have won.”

“Had evolution favoured only self-interest, neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism would have emerged.”
“Had the players met only once, defection would have dominated.”

Topic connection: evolutionary history is inherently counterfactual — had the selective pressures been different…
⚠  Common errors:
× “Were it not for cooperation, life had been very different.” → use would have been (not had been) in the result clause.
× “Should the strategy would fail…” → no modal after Should: “Should the strategy fail…”
× “Had they cooperated, they would cooperate more.” → keep past hypothetical in result clause: would have cooperated.
Lesson Procedure
Time
Stage
Skill
Teacher does
Students do
0–6
Lead-in
Speaking
Board: “Rank these from most to least rational: (a) always cooperate, (b) always defect, (c) cooperate unless betrayed, (d) random.” Justify. Then: what does ‘rational’ mean if cooperation outperforms defection?
Rank. Justify. Debate.
6–17
H1 Vocab
Vocab
10 academic terms. Key: evolutionarily stable strategy (can’t be invaded). defection (choosing self-interest over cooperation). fitness cost (evolutionary cost of altruism). Parts A, B, C.
Read. Match. Gap-fill.
17–32
H2 Grammar
Grammar
Three inverted conditional types. Were / Should / Had. Inversion = omit if, move auxiliary. Common errors. Exercises 1–4.
Study all three. Exercises 1–4.
32–50
H3 Reading
Reading
‘The Rationality of Kindness.’ T/F/NG + comprehension + analysis. Key: find inverted conditionals. Discuss: does this change the moral value of kindness?
Read. Analyse. Discuss.
50–65
H4 Listening
Listening
Read ‘The Game Behind the Gift’ TWICE. Script below. MCQ. Notes. Evaluation Task 3.
MCQ. Notes. Evaluate.
65–78
H5 Speaking
Speaking
Seminar: “If kindness is rational, it is no longer truly kind — it is merely strategic.” Encourage inverted conditionals.
Argue. Academic language.
78–90
H6 Writing
Writing
Three options. 250–300 words. One Were, one Should or Had required. Plan in class; complete for homework.
Choose. Plan. Begin.
Listening Script — ‘The Game Behind the Gift’
Dr. James Holt (evolutionary biologist, 44) and Dr. Sarah Chen (game theorist, 39). Inverted conditionals embedded throughout. Read TWICE. Students do NOT see this script.
Sarah:
James, the standard economics assumption is that agents are rational and self-interested. The evolutionary record seems to contradict this. How do you reconcile them?
James:
I think the contradiction disappears once you extend the time horizon. Were we to define rationality as maximising short-term individual payoff, then yes — altruism is irrational. But evolution doesn’t work on that timescale. The unit of selection is the gene across generations, not the individual in a single interaction. And genes that code for cooperation under the right conditions have been extraordinarily successful.
Sarah:
That’s where kin selection comes in — Hamilton’s rule. But surely that only explains cooperation between relatives?
James:
It explains the foundation. Trivers’ reciprocal altruism extends it to non-kin. The key variable is the probability of future interaction. Should two agents never meet again, the game-theoretic case for cooperation collapses. But in small, stable social groups — which describes most of our evolutionary history — repeated interaction is the norm, not the exception.
Sarah:
Axelrod’s work demonstrated this powerfully. The tit-for-tat strategy won not because it was clever but because it was legible — cooperative partners could predict it and calibrate their own behaviour accordingly. Had tit-for-tat been more complex, it would have created uncertainty and undermined the very trust it depended on.
James:
And the forgiveness element is crucial. Were tit-for-tat unforgiving — one defection and the relationship is over — it would be vulnerable to accidental defection and noise. A small error would cascade into permanent mutual defection. The evolutionary record strongly favours strategies with short punishment phases and rapid return to cooperation.
Sarah:
The indirect reciprocity argument is perhaps the most striking for large-scale human cooperation. We cooperate with strangers we will never meet again — which seems to defeat the reciprocal altruism model entirely.
James:
Reputation solves this. Should your cooperative behaviour become known — and in small communities it invariably does — then third parties are more likely to cooperate with you. Had early human groups lacked the capacity for reputation transmission, the scale of cooperation we see in human societies simply would not have been possible.
Sarah:
Which suggests the most interesting implication for the social sciences: kindness and self-interest are not opposites. They converge, over time and at scale, in environments where interaction is repeated and reputation is visible.
James:
Were we to take that seriously as a design principle, the implications for institutional design — how we structure schools, workplaces, communities — would be quite profound.
Grammar in the script:
Were… “Were we to define rationality as…” / “Were tit-for-tat unforgiving…” / “Were we to take that seriously…”
Should… “Should two agents never meet again…” / “Should your cooperative behaviour become known…”
Had… “Had tit-for-tat been more complex…” / “Had early human groups lacked…”
Answer Key
Handout 1 — Vocabulary
Part B — Match: 1. defection  ·  2. tit-for-tat  ·  3. prisoner’s dilemma  ·  4. reputation  ·  5. evolutionarily stable strategy
Part C — Gap-fill: 1. altruism  ·  2. reciprocity  ·  3. kin selection  ·  4. iterated game  ·  5. fitness cost
Handout 2 — Grammar
Exercise 1 — Identify type: 1. Were (G1)  ·  2. Had (G3)  ·  3. Should (G2)  ·  4. Were (G1)  ·  5. Had (G3)
Exercise 2 — Rewrite: 1. Were self-interest the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.  ·  2. Should defectors become too numerous, cooperative networks begin to exclude them.  ·  3. Had Axelrod run only one round, defection would have dominated.  ·  4. Were reputation to disappear entirely, indirect reciprocity would collapse.
Exercise 3 — Error correction: 1. “had been” → “would have been” in result clause  ·  2. “would fail” → “fail” (no modal after Should)  ·  3. “would cooperate” → “would have cooperated” (past hypothetical result)
Exercise 4 — Write your own (open): Assess for correct inversion structure, appropriate modal in result clause, and topical relevance.
Handout 3 — Reading
T/F/NG: 1. F (defection is dominant in one-shot, not iterated)  ·  2. T  ·  3. T  ·  4. NG  ·  5. T
Comprehension: Q1: niceness (starts cooperative), retaliation (punishes defection), forgiveness (returns quickly to cooperation), clarity (predictable and legible). Q2: Reputation allows third parties who observe cooperative behaviour to cooperate in return, even without direct interaction — extending cooperation to strangers. Q3: any two inverted conditionals from the text with type identified.
Handout 4 — Listening
MCQ: 1. b  ·  2. c  ·  3. b
Notes: time horizon / gene / generations / kin / reciprocal / probability / repeated / legible / trust / forgiveness / accidental / cascade / reputation / third parties / scale / institutional design
Task 3 evaluation (open): The central tension is whether a rational basis for kindness undermines or strengthens its moral value. Stronger responses will distinguish between the motivation (strategic vs genuine) and the consequences (identical in either case), and engage with whether moral value attaches to acts or to intentions.

Why Kindness is Rational

Social Awareness & Relationship Skills — SEL · Student Handouts · B2–C1 · 90 min
Name:  
Date:  
Class:  

Handout 1

Vocabulary

Vocabulary
Part A — Key Terms (B2–C1)
Term
Meaning and example
altruism
Behaviour that benefits others at a cost to oneself; selfless concern for others’ welfare. “Were altruism purely irrational, evolution would have eliminated it long ago.”
reciprocity
The practice of exchanging benefits mutually; helping others in expectation of return help. “Direct reciprocity explains cooperation between individuals who interact repeatedly.”
evolutionarily stable strategy
A strategy that, once established in a population, cannot be invaded by alternative strategies. “Had tit-for-tat not been an evolutionarily stable strategy, it would not have persisted.”
prisoner’s dilemma
A game theory scenario where two rational agents, acting in self-interest, choose mutual defection over mutual cooperation, producing a worse outcome for both. “Should the prisoner’s dilemma be played once, defection dominates; in iterated versions, cooperation emerges.”
kin selection
The evolutionary tendency to favour the survival of relatives who share genetic material. “Were relatedness the only driver, kin selection would explain all altruism — but it doesn’t.”
defection
The act of choosing self-interest over cooperation in a strategic interaction; the decision not to cooperate. “Had all agents chosen defection, the total payoff would have been lower than under mutual cooperation.”
tit-for-tat
A reciprocal strategy: cooperate on the first move, then copy the opponent’s previous move. “Should you adopt tit-for-tat, you signal both willingness to cooperate and willingness to retaliate.”
reputation
The general belief others hold about a person based on past behaviour; a record of trustworthiness or unreliability. “Were reputation not observable, indirect reciprocity could not sustain large-scale cooperation.”
iterated game
A game played multiple times by the same players, allowing strategies to evolve in response to past behaviour. “Had the game not been iterated, tit-for-tat would have had no advantage over unconditional defection.”
fitness cost
The reduction in reproductive success associated with a behaviour; the evolutionary price of altruism. “Should the fitness cost of altruism be too high, genes promoting it cannot spread.”
Part B — Match the Term
1.Choosing to act in self-interest rather than cooperate in a strategic interaction → _______________
2.Cooperate first, then copy what the opponent did last time → _______________
3.The scenario where rational self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all → _______________
4.The record of past behaviour that allows others to decide whether to cooperate with you → _______________
5.A strategy that cannot be displaced once it takes hold in a population → _______________
Part C — Fill in the Gaps

altruism  ·  reciprocity  ·  kin selection  ·  iterated game  ·  fitness cost

1.Were _______________ purely irrational, natural selection would have eliminated it from the gene pool.
2.Direct _______________ operates between agents who interact repeatedly — I help you because I expect you to help me in return.
3.Hamilton’s rule predicts that _______________ can evolve when the benefit to the recipient, weighted by relatedness, exceeds the actor’s cost.
4.Had the prisoner’s dilemma not been an _______________, cooperation would never have emerged as the dominant strategy.
5.Should the _______________ of cooperation exceed the benefit to the gene, genes promoting cooperation cannot spread by natural selection.

Handout 2

Grammar

Grammar
★  Star Structure — Inverted Conditionals

Inverted conditionals omit if and move the auxiliary verb before the subject. This produces a more formal, academic register — and is characteristic of the counterfactual reasoning that runs throughout evolutionary biology and game theory.

Rule: Remove if → move auxiliary before subject → keep result clause unchanged.

G1: Were… — hypothetical present or future
Normal: “If self-interest were the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.”
Inverted: “Were self-interest the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.”

“Were defection the evolutionarily stable strategy, cooperative societies could not persist.”
“Were reputation to disappear, indirect reciprocity would collapse.”
“Were tit-for-tat not forgiving, it would lose its advantage rapidly.”

▶  Use for present or future hypotheticals: if…were → Were…
G2: Should… — formal future or present condition
Normal: “If a player should encounter the same opponent again, cooperation becomes rational.”
Inverted: “Should a player encounter the same opponent again, cooperation becomes rational.”

“Should defectors become too numerous, cooperative networks begin to exclude them.”
“Should your cooperative behaviour become known, third parties are more likely to help you.”

▶  Use for formal future conditions: if…should → Should…
G3: Had… — past hypothetical
Normal: “If Axelrod had run only one round, tit-for-tat would not have won.”
Inverted: “Had Axelrod run only one round, tit-for-tat would not have won.”

“Had evolution favoured only self-interest, altruism would not have persisted.”
“Had early human groups lacked reputation transmission, large-scale cooperation would not have been possible.”

▶  Use for past hypotheticals: if…had → Had…
⚠  Common errors:
× “Were it not for cooperation, life had been very different.” → would have been in result clause.
× “Should the strategy would fail…” → no modal after Should: “Should the strategy fail…”
× “Had they cooperated, they would cooperate more.” → past hypothetical result: would have cooperated.
Exercise 1 — Identify the type: G1 (Were), G2 (Should), or G3 (Had)
1.  “Were self-interest the only driver of behaviour, altruism could not have evolved.”
Type: ___
2.  “Had Axelrod not run iterated tournaments, the power of tit-for-tat would not have been demonstrated.”
Type: ___
3.  “Should the probability of future interaction fall below a critical threshold, reciprocal altruism breaks down.”
Type: ___
4.  “Were reputation not observable to third parties, indirect reciprocity would be impossible.”
Type: ___
5.  “Had Hamilton not derived his rule mathematically, kin selection would have remained a verbal hypothesis.”
Type: ___
Exercise 2 — Rewrite using inverted conditional form
1.  “If self-interest were the only evolutionary pressure, altruism would not exist.”  [Were]
→ _______________________________________________
2.  “If defectors should become too numerous in the population, cooperative networks begin to exclude them.”  [Should]
→ _______________________________________________
3.  “If Axelrod had run only one round, defection would have dominated.”  [Had]
→ _______________________________________________
4.  “If reputation were to disappear entirely, indirect reciprocity would collapse.”  [Were]
→ _______________________________________________
Exercise 3 — Correct the error
1.  “Were it not for cooperation, human civilisation had been impossible.”
Corrected: _______________________________________________
2.  “Should the strategy would fail, the population would revert to defection.”
Corrected: _______________________________________________
3.  “Had early humans cooperated more, they would cooperate on an even larger scale today.”
Corrected: _______________________________________________
Exercise 4 — Write your own sentences using this topic
1.  Were kindness not also rational in many contexts…
→ _______________________________________________
2.  Should two people meet repeatedly over a long period…
→ _______________________________________________
3.  Had tit-for-tat never been discovered…
→ _______________________________________________

Handout 3

Reading

Reading
Mind & Society · Evolutionary Science

The Rationality of Kindness

Were self-interest the only driver of human behaviour, the societies we have built would be impossible to explain. The mathematics of cooperation tells a different story.

In a single interaction between two strangers who will never meet again, the game-theoretic case for cooperation is weak. Whatever the other player does, you do marginally better by defecting — a conclusion that mathematicians formalised as the prisoner’s dilemma. Had rational self-interest been the only variable, defection would be universal and cooperation would be an evolutionary anomaly.

It is not. Cooperation is ubiquitous in the natural world — from the cellular machinery of every living organism to the complex reciprocal arrangements of human societies. The question is not whether cooperation exists, but why rational agents would choose it.

The Iterated Answer

Robert Axelrod’s computer tournaments in the 1980s provided a compelling answer. When the prisoner’s dilemma is played repeatedly by the same agents, the dynamics invert. Were a player to defect in an iterated game, their opponent could retaliate in all subsequent rounds, eliminating the cooperative surplus both had accumulated. The shadow of the future — the prospect of future interactions — makes cooperation rational in the present.

The winning strategy in Axelrod’s tournaments, tit-for-tat, succeeded through four properties: niceness (it cooperates first), retaliation (it punishes defection immediately), forgiveness (it returns to cooperation as soon as the opponent does), and clarity (its behaviour is predictable). Should tit-for-tat fail to retaliate, it would be exploited. Should it fail to forgive, it would lock both parties into permanent mutual defection.

Beyond the Pair

Kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) explains altruism toward relatives: genes promoting cooperation with others who share those genes can spread, because they effectively help copies of themselves. But this cannot explain the scale of human cooperation, which routinely extends to non-relatives and even strangers. Reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) extends the model: had the probability of future interaction been negligible throughout our evolutionary history, reciprocal altruism could not have taken hold. The small, stable social groups in which humans evolved provided exactly the conditions required.

“Were we to take the mathematics of cooperation seriously, we would stop seeing kindness and rationality as opposites. They are, under the conditions that describe most of human life, the same thing.”

Indirect reciprocity — helping strangers because observers will cooperate with you in turn — extends this further. Should your reputation as a cooperator become established, you attract cooperative partners without ever needing to repay individuals directly. The entire apparatus of social norms, moral emotions, and reputational concern that characterises human societies can be understood, in part, as a system for making kindness individually rational at large scale.

Task 1 — True (T), False (F), or Not Given (NG)?
1.  In a single interaction, defection is the rational dominant strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma.[ T / F / NG ]
2.  Tit-for-tat won Axelrod’s tournaments because it always cooperated and never retaliated.[ T / F / NG ]
3.  The article says reciprocal altruism evolved in part because early humans lived in stable social groups.[ T / F / NG ]
4.  The article claims that all human moral behaviour can be fully explained by game theory.[ T / F / NG ]
5.  According to the article, reputation allows cooperation to extend beyond direct reciprocal relationships.[ T / F / NG ]
Task 2 — Comprehension and Analysis
1.  What are the four properties of tit-for-tat, and why is each one necessary?
_______________________________________________
2.  How does indirect reciprocity extend cooperation to strangers? What role does reputation play?
_______________________________________________
3.  Find two inverted conditionals in the article. Write them and identify their type (G1/G2/G3).
(1) _______________ Type: ___  ·  (2) _______________ Type: ___

Handout 4

Listening

Listening
Dr. James Holt (evolutionary biologist) and Dr. Sarah Chen (game theorist) discuss the science of cooperation. Your teacher will read the conversation TWICE.
Task 1 — Choose the Correct Answer
1.  How does James resolve the apparent contradiction between self-interest and altruism?
A.  He argues that most people are not actually self-interested.
B.  He extends the definition of rationality to include long-term gene-level selection across generations.
C.  He claims that evolutionary biology disproves game theory entirely.
2.  Why was tit-for-tat’s simplicity and legibility important, according to Sarah?
A.  It made tit-for-tat easier for researchers to programme.
B.  It allowed cooperative players to predict its behaviour and feel safe cooperating with it.
C.  Simpler strategies always win in evolutionary competitions.
3.  What does James say about the role of reputation in large-scale human cooperation?
A.  Reputation only works in small communities and breaks down at scale.
B.  Reputation enables cooperation with strangers by allowing third parties to act on observed behaviour.
C.  Reputation is less important than direct reciprocity for most human interactions.
Task 2 — Complete the Notes

The Game Behind the Gift — Key Points

James on rationality: Were we to define rationality as maximising short-term payoff, altruism is _______________. But evolution works on the level of the _______________ across generations. Genes coding for cooperation have been extraordinarily _______________.
Trivers’ key variable: Should two agents never meet again, the case for cooperation _______________. But in small, stable social groups, _______________ interaction is the norm.
Sarah on tit-for-tat: Had tit-for-tat been more complex, it would have created _______________ and undermined the very _______________ it depended on. Its legibility allowed partners to _______________ with confidence.
James on forgiveness: Were tit-for-tat unforgiving, it would be vulnerable to _______________ defection. A small error would cascade into permanent mutual _______________.
Reputation and scale: Should cooperative behaviour become known, _______________ parties are more likely to cooperate. Had early humans lacked reputation transmission, the _______________ of cooperation we observe would not have been possible.
Task 3 — Grammar Hunt & Evaluation
1.  Find one Were… (G1) and one Had… (G3) from the conversation.
(G1) _______________  ·  (G3) _______________
2.  James and Sarah both argue that kindness and self-interest converge “over time and at scale.” Does this mean kindness is no longer truly altruistic if it eventually benefits the agent? Explain your position.
_______________________________________________
3.  James says the implications for “institutional design” would be “quite profound.” What one specific change to a school, workplace, or community would you recommend, based on the science in this lesson?
_______________________________________________

Handout 5

Speaking

Speaking
Seminar — Kindness, Strategy, and Moral Value

Discuss in groups of three or four. Use evidence from the reading and listening. Use at least two inverted conditionals in your contributions.

1.The motion: “If kindness is rational, it is no longer truly kind — it is merely strategic.” Argue for or against.
Use: “Were kindness truly strategic and nothing more…” / “Had the science shown otherwise…”
2.The design question. James says the implications for institutional design are “quite profound.” What specific changes would you recommend — to a school, a workplace, or a community — based on the science in this lesson?
3.The one-shot problem. The game-theoretic case for kindness depends on repeated interaction. What happens in genuinely one-shot situations — anonymous transactions, brief encounters, online interactions? Is kindness still rational there?
4.The reputation paradox. Indirect reciprocity works through observable reputation. But if people are kind because they want a good reputation, is that really altruism? Does the motivation matter, or only the behaviour?

Handout 6

Writing

Writing
Writing Task
Choose one:
Option A — Personal / Analytical B2–C1: Describe a situation where acting kindly also turned out to be strategically rational for you. Does the rational basis for your kindness change how you think about it?

Option B — Argumentative C1: “The science of cooperation does not explain away kindness — it vindicates it.” Evaluate this claim, drawing on the evolutionary and game-theory evidence in the lesson.

Option C — Opinion / Evaluation C1: What specific changes to educational institutions would follow from taking the science of cooperation seriously? Address likely objections.

Word count: 250–300 words
Your text must include:
Were…  at least once  ·  Had… or Should…  at least once  ·  at least three vocabulary terms from Handout 1  ·  a clear thesis  ·  a concession
Self-check:  [ ] Were… used  [ ] Had… or Should… used  [ ] three vocabulary terms  [ ] thesis in introduction  [ ] concession included  [ ] 250–300 words